WILL KYMLICKA

2005 Trudeau Fellow, Queen's University

BIOGRAPHY

Will Kymlicka is the Canada Research Chair in Political Philosophy at Queen's University. He is recognized as one of the world's most influential political philosophers, and his work on the link between justice and diversity has helped to shape the debate on the rights and status of ethnocultural groups in liberal democracies. At present, he is investigating the role of the international community in promoting ideas of multiculturalism and minority rights, and exploring how Canada is sometimes invoked as a model for the rest of the world.

Elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada in 2003, he has also been a visiting professor at universities around the world, with a recurring role in the Nationalism Studies Program at the Central European University in Budapest. He was the president of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy from 2004 to 2006. He has won numerous awards and honours, such as the Killam Prize in 2004 and the Trudeau Fellowship in 2005.

Professor Kymlicka is the author of many books and articles, and has edited numerous publications. His works have been translated into 34 languages. His best-known books include *Contemporary Political Philosophy* (1990; 2002); *Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada* (1998); *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship* (2001), *Multicultural Citizenship* (1995), which was awarded the C.B. Macpherson Prize by the Canadian Political Science Association, and the Ralph Bunche Award by the American Political Science Association, and *Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity* (2007), awarded the North American Society for Social

Philosophy Book Award. His most recent book is *Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights* (2011), co-authored with Sue Donaldson.

Will Kymlicka received his bachelor's degree in philosophy and politics from Queen's University in 1984, and his D.Phil. in philosophy from the University of Oxford in 1987.

ABSTRACT

Debates on responsible citizenship are as old as democracy itself. In every generation, people have worried about whether citizens are able and willing to enact their citizenship in responsible ways. Some worry about the apparent decline of public-spiritedness among citizens; others worry that even public-spirited citizens lack meaningful opportunities to exercise their citizenship. The solution typically is to propose reforms (educational, social, economic, political) that would instill a greater sense of civic virtue among citizens, and/or provide them greater spaces to be active and responsible.

In this paper, I take a different tack on the debate. Rather than starting with a static list of the desired virtues or sites of responsible citizenship, I suggest we should instead think about the dynamic and relational process of *citizenization*. Building relations of democratic citizenship is a historical and social project. It requires a commitment by society to reorder social relationships on the basis of fundamental political values of freedom and democracy. To promote responsible citizenship in a meaningful and durable way, we need to understand better the nature of this social project of citizenization, and why it is so often fragile and incomplete.

I begin, in section 1, with a review of the traditional debate on responsible citizenship and then offer the alternative citizenization framework in section 2, and conclude with some suggestions about the sort of research agenda that would flow from this alternative framework (section 3), and the potential role of the Foundation in it (section 4).

Responsible Citizenship

1. The Traditional Debate on Responsible Citizenship

Debates on responsible citizenship typically start from the assumption that the formal/legal status of citizenship is relatively unproblematic—we all know who citizens are—and the key question is how to ensure that people are able and willing to enact their citizenship in responsible ways. There is a perennial debate about responsible citizenship in this sense, which largely takes the following form:

- devising a list of the relevant traits and dispositions of active and responsible citizens (virtues such as self-restraint, concern for others, tolerance of differences, open-mindedness, prudence, public-interestedness, etc.) and their corresponding vices (selfishness, indifference, apathy, intolerance, dogmatism, short-sightedness);[1]

1. One typical list, adapted from William Galston, includes (i) general virtues: courage; law-abidingness; loyalty; (ii) social virtues: independence; open-mindedness; (iii) economic virtues: work ethic; capacity to delay self-gratification; adaptability to economic and technological change; and (iv) political virtues: capacity to discern and respect the rights of others; willingness to demand only what can be paid for; ability to evaluate the performance of those in office; willingness to engage in public discourse (Galston, 1991).

- identifying the "seedbeds" of responsible citizenship so defined—i.e., asking what role different institutions such as schools, media, churches, families, workplaces, NGOs, etc. play in fostering these dispositions;

- identifying the "sites" of responsible citizenship—i.e., asking what role different institutions play in creating public spaces or forums for the exercise of responsible citizenship (political parties, media, NGOs, local community associations, unions);

- speculating about whether these seedbeds and sites of responsible citizenship are still functioning effectively. Some critics worry that the seedbeds of responsible citizenship are being eroded or corrupted (e.g., the decline of churches, the decline of the traditional two-parent family, the dumbing down of the media, the commercialization of education, the weakening of local community due to increased mobility or increased diversity, etc.), leading to a decline in solidarity, participation, public reasonableness, and so on. Other critics worry that the sites of responsible citizenship are being eroded or corrupted (e.g., the corporate takeover of the media, the over-centralization of the legislative process, the increased role of money in the political process), or at least that they are systematically biased against particular groups, defined to suit the interests and perspectives of dominant groups, leading to forms of exclusion and marginalization. Citizenship may be threatened either by a declining sense of public spiritedness, and/or by barriers to the exercise of responsible citizenship.

This conceptual framework of dispositions, sites, and seedbeds underpins much of the academic research, public policy initiatives, and NGO or philanthropic activity on citizenship education and citizenship promotion.

Indeed, it has done so for many years now, although the focus of concern has changed over the years. We have seen several waves of concern for citizenship promotion, in response to perceived deficits or declines in the desired dispositions, sites, and seedbeds. In the past, for example, there has been concern that youth as a group was disaffected or apathetic, and hence active efforts were needed to promote responsible citizenship among the younger generation. At

other times, there was a concern that a certain type of materialism or "possessive individualism" was coming to dominate society, displacing earlier commitments to more civic or public-spirited values, encouraging people to see themselves first and foremost as consumers rather than as citizens.[2]

Today, however, the overwhelming focus of citizenship debates concerns issues of ethnic and religious diversity in general, and immigration in particular. Immigration has led to a dramatic increase in ethnic and racial diversity across the Western democracies, and this is seen by many commentators as putting stress on the traditional supports of responsible citizenship. Immigrant groups are often seen as lacking the necessary dispositions of responsible citizenship, particularly if they came from non-democratic countries, and moreover, the increase in racial and religious diversity in the population is often seen as eroding general levels of solidarity and trust in society, even among native-born citizens. This is the sobering conclusion of Robert Putnam's enormously influential studies, which seem to show a consistently negative correlation between levels of ethnic diversity and levels of social capital across the United States (Putnam, 2007).

Across the Western democracies, therefore, we have witnessed a new "citizenship agenda" in the past decade, as governments attempt to renew or rebuild the sites and seedbeds of responsible citizenship in the face of growing diversity. Citizenship is to be promoted by, among other things, adding or strengthening citizenship education in schools, providing citizenship classes to immigrants, imposing new citizenship tests for naturalization, and holding citizenship ceremonies. As this list makes clear, the focus of much of this anxiety

2. Some commentators view this shift from citizens to consumers as a product of the neoliberal ideology that came to dominance in the 1980s and 1990s, but we can find versions of this concern much earlier, at least back to the 1950s. I will return to the relationship between neoliberalism and citizenship below.

is immigrants and their perceived lack of integration, and the impact of their "otherness" on the dispositions of responsible citizenship.

Much has been written about this new citizenship agenda, and in particular about the ways that immigration (and multicultural-ism) is being implicitly or explicitly blamed for the decline of active citizenship.[3] Critics argue that this new citizenship agenda panders to xenophobic sentiments (Wright, 2008) and reproduces ideological assumptions about the essential national homogeneity of existing citizens and of the alien otherness of newcomers (Blackledge, 2004; Stevenson, 2006; Milani, 2008). Defenders argue that it is needed to avoid the "multicultural tragedy" of growing ethnic segregation and polarization, and is based on a good-faith commitment to enabling full participation of diverse groups by encouraging (or indeed compelling) the formation of the appropriate dispositions, sites, and seedbeds of citizenship. On this view, a renewed emphasis on citizenship is sometimes offered as an alternative to older (failed) ideas of multiculturalism—David Blunkett in the United Kingdom repeatedly contrasted a citizenship agenda with a multiculturalism agenda (McGhee, 2009, 48).

I have argued elsewhere that this debate over the new citizen-ship agenda rests on a series of empirical assumptions about the link between immigration, diversity, and citizenship that are false, at least in relation to Canada (Kymlicka, 2010). It is simply not true that immigrants lack the dispositions of responsible citizenship, or that increased diversity due to immigration erodes solidarity and civic participation in Canada (Soroka, Johnston, and Banting, 2007;

3. In the British case, this growing preoccupation with immigration as the cause of declining citizenship is particularly clear. The government's 1998 Crick Report on citizenship education was initiated by perceptions of growing apathy among youth, but the subsequent public debate and resulting public policy was overwhelmingly driven by issues of immigration (Kiwan, 2008, 62). See also McGhee (2009) for a genealogy of how concerns about "community cohesion" in Britain became focused on immigrants.

Bloemraad, 2006; Kazemipur, 2009; Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010). There is no "multicultural tragedy" in Canada that needs to be fixed or solved through a new citizenship agenda.

In this discussion paper, however, I want to set aside the empirical debates on immigration, multiculturalism, and citizenship, and to focus instead on the underlying conceptualization of responsible citizenship itself. Rather than asking how this traditional framework of dispositions, seedbeds, and sites has been (mis)applied to immigrants in Canada, I want to raise a deeper question about whether this framework is the right way to think about responsible citizenship in the first place.

In my view, framing responsible citizenship in terms of a list of dispositions, seedbeds, and sites is too narrow, and overly static. Reducing citizenship to a set of traits and sites misses the dynamic and relational quality of democratic citizenship. In the next section, therefore, I will offer an alternative framework for conceptualizing responsible citizenship.

2. Citizenization: An Alternative Framework

In place of static lists of desirable traits and sites, I suggest we should reframe the debate by thinking instead in terms of "citizenization," understood as both a historic process and a social project.[4] Citizenization is a commitment by society to reordering social relationships on the basis of fundamental political values of freedom and democracy.

It might help to begin with an example. Consider the case of ethnic diversity. Historically, relations between ethnic groups have often been defined in illiberal and undemocratic ways—including

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4. I take the term from James Tully, who has talked briefly but suggestively about the idea of citizenization as a central historical process and normative goal (Tully, 2001, 25). However, I adapt it for my own purposes, and he might not agree with my interpretation of it.

relations of conqueror and conquered, colonizer and colonized, settler and indigenous, racialized and unmarked, normalized and deviant, orthodox and heretic, civilized and backward, ally and enemy, master and slave. The task for all liberal democracies has been to turn this catalogue of uncivil relations into relationships of liberal-democratic citizenship, both in terms of the vertical relationship between the members of minorities and the state, and the horizontal relationships among the members of different groups. This is the origin of the models of "multicultural citizenship," minority rights, and indigenous rights that we see across various Western democracies.

We can see similar historical dynamics in other spheres, whether in relation to gender, sexual orientation, or the treatment of the mentally ill or people with disabilities. In all of these cases, we can see efforts to replace earlier uncivil relations of domination, coercion, and intolerance with newer relations of democratic citizenship. Indeed, all these movements have had similar trajectories starting in the 1960s, and have often borrowed arguments and strategies from each other.

Citizenization in this sense is a profound historical process, which we largely take for granted in the perennial debate about responsible citizenship. But it is a fragile and incomplete achievement, with complex social and political preconditions that need to be continually created or sustained. It means much more than simply extending formal citizenship to disadvantaged or excluded groups, since this can be done in a unilateral and paternalistic way. This indeed is how Canadian citizenship was extended to Aboriginal peoples in 1960. Citizenization, by contrast, involves a willingness to negotiate as equals the terms of belonging with the goal of reaching consent. In the case of Aboriginal peoples, this process arguably only really began in the 1970s, when the Canadian government abandoned its paternalistic and assimilationist approach, and decided instead to enter into good-faith negotiations over land claims and

self-government. Notice that citizenization in this context not only goes beyond formal citizenship, but also includes the willingness to consider challenges to the state's legitimacy and jurisdiction upon which that formal citizenship is based. Insofar as state authority was initially imposed by force on Aboriginal peoples, the commitment to replacing force and paternalism with democratic consent and autonomy requires renegotiating as equals the terms of belonging. In that sense, when some Aboriginal leaders insist they never consented to being Canadian citizens, this can nonetheless be seen as part of a process of citizenization. So long as the goal is to replace force with democratic consent, and to replace hierarchy with non-domination, then we have citizenization.

Similarly, homosexuals and people with disabilities have always had the legal status of citizens, but it is only with the disability rights and gay rights movements that we see the initial stages of genuine citizenization.[5]

But if citizenization is about more than the formal status of citizenship, what more or what else does it involve? Tully says that it involves a commitment to allowing all who are affected by common rules to help determine those rules (*quod omnes tangit*— what touches all must be agreed to by all). But this in turn rests on a deeper set of values. Citizenization, I would argue, is premised on values such as autonomy, agency, consent, trust, participation, authenticity, and self-determination. Part of what it is to treat people as

5. In his 2007 position paper "Human Rights and Social Justice" for the Foundation, Roderick A. Macdonald argued that human rights are too formalistic and individualistic to achieve human dignity and social inclusion, which require a focus instead on organic relationships. In a way, the idea of citizenization is likewise intended to emphasize that the historic task is not only to endow individuals with this or that citizenship right, but also to build new social relationships based on social values of trust, autonomy, participation, and so on. But I would insist more strongly than Macdonald that human rights (and minority rights) are an absolute precondition for citizenization.

democratic citizens is to treat them in ways that affirm and respect these values. Citizenization assumes that citizens have a subjective good that they are able to express, and that our shared rules must be responsive to those expressions, and that we trust each other to negotiate those shared rules in ways that respect each other's autonomy and identity, and to cooperate in good faith.

As I said, citizenization in this sense is both fragile and incomplete. The "securitization" of Muslims in the West after 9/11 is an example of a retreat from citizenization: a withdrawal of trust, a resort to force and coercion and *raison d'État* rather than dialogue (Cesari, 2009; Ibrahim, 2005; Brown, 2010). The treatment of the poor is also always vulnerable to retreat from citizenization to force and paternalism (Geutzkow, 2010). And the treatment of people with mental disabilities is an example of the incomplete nature of citizenization (Prince, 2009; Carey, 2009). Too often, they remain subject to forms of paternalistic and coercive rule, rather than receiving our best efforts to solicit and be responsive to their own subjective good. We still have trouble conceptualizing how we can turn our relations to people with mental disabilities into relations based on values of citizenship.

It should be clear, I hope, how this alternative framework offers a different perspective on responsible citizenship than the traditional approach. On the citizenization model, promoting responsible citizenship is first and foremost about identifying inherited patterns of social relationships—in particular, identifying those social relationships that have historically been defined on the basis of values other than democratic consent and autonomy—and then asking what sorts of measures would remedy that historic failing.

All of this is related, of course, to the old debate about responsible citizenship. Much of what I have just said can be rephrased in the familiar language about the seedbeds and sites of responsible citizenship. If the status of Muslims, people with mental disabilities, or the poor is inadequate from a democratic point of view, we can

ask about the potential seedbeds of greater tolerance, and about the potential sites where the democratic agency of under-represented groups can be enhanced. But that familiar language misses the historic and relational aspects of the problem. The problem is not (or not only) that this or that group of citizens is unable or unwilling to exercise their citizenship, which can be remedied by strengthening one or another seedbed or site of citizenship. The problem, rather, is that we have inherited a society in which certain relationships have not been defined as relationships that should be governed by the values of citizenship—those relationships have not been fully or adequately subject to the process of citizenization. We can answer questions about the appropriate traits and sites of citizenship only if we first determine how the relevant relationships have historically been defined in uncivil ways, and then consider to what extent society has truly committed itself to reordering those relationships on the basis of citizenship, and identify the obstacles to that process.

3. Toward a New Research Agenda

I believe that recasting old debates about responsible citizenship in the frame of citizenization could lead to a more productive set of research questions, and also potentially to a more constructive public debate, and even to better policy responses. Let me explore a few such implications.

First, if we think of citizenization as a process, not a static list of traits or sites, then we need to ask, In what contexts can relationships of citizenship be established, among which individuals or groups? The idea of citizenization encourages us to expand our sense of the possibilities. At the moment, some groups in our society are—children, the mentally disabled, animals—seen as lacking the capacities to enter into relations of citizenship. We have trouble conceptualizing how our relations with such groups can be one of citizenship, rather than one of (purportedly) benign paternalism, given that these groups cannot engage in public reason or political

deliberation. We rule over them, rather than engage in any process of shared rule.

In my view, this is a mistake, which flows from thinking of citizenship as a set of traits rather than a relationship that is structured according to core civic values. The reality is that these relationships can be subject to processes of citizenization if we learn how to better understand individuals' agency, to identify their expressions of subjective good, and to create mechanisms that are more responsive to their good. Of course, some degree of paternalism will inevitably remain (but that is true even in the case of "normal" adults). But citizenization is a commitment to building relationships upon values such as autonomy, agency, consent, trust, participation, authenticity, and self-determination. Those values are absolutely relevant to relations with children, the mentally disabled, and at least certain categories of animals (particularly domesticated animals). Many commentators will worry that this stretches the concept of citizenship too far, but I would argue that we can judge the outer limits of citizenization only by actually trying to engage in it, and there are many encouraging experiments in citizenization in relation to these groups. The historic presumption that these groups can be ruled only by force and paternalism has inhibited both academic research and public debate into the possibilities of reordering these relationships on the basis of agency and participation, but in the past few years, the beginnings of a potentially revolutionary change in our thinking and our practices has occurred.[6]

Similarly, we can also ask about citizenization beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. The traditional debate on responsible citizenship presupposes a certain degree of "boundedness." Citizens

6. Excellent work has been done recently on new models of citizenship for people with mental disabilities (e.g., Arneil, 2009; Francis and Silvers, 2007), and for children (e.g., Rehfeld, 2010; Archard and Macleod, 2002). I apply a citizenization framework to the rights of domesticated animals in Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011).

are defined as the long-term members of a bounded political community, and it is relations among these members that have, to date, been subject to (incomplete, fragile) processes of citizenization. But we clearly have politically relevant relationships with people beyond our borders, as well as with temporary residents within our borders (such as tourists, business visitors, temporary asylum-seekers, or migrant workers) who are not (or not yet) formal citizens. At the moment, we typically think that in relation to such people we have a duty to respect their universal human rights, but that we do not have a duty to reorder our relationships on the basis of citizenship values. We relate to them as, say, guests to whom we have a duty of hospitality, but no duty to give them the democratic opportunity to reshape the rules of the house in which they are guests.

This reluctance to restructure these relationships on the basis of values of democratic consent and autonomy is explained, at least in part, by the thought that it is implausible to extend the status of formal citizenship to such persons. To accord formal citizenship to foreigners beyond our borders, or to temporary visitors within our borders, would be inconsistent with the principle of popular sovereignty upon which the legitimacy of modern states is based (Saward, 2000; Yack, 2001). But as we've seen, citizenization is a broader and deeper idea than that of formal citizenship. Thinking of citizenization as a process, rather than a fixed list of traits or sites, opens up space for thinking about new political possibilities. Given that so many of our decisions affect the well-being of people outside our borders, and given that seemingly temporary residents may end up spending long periods of time within our borders (consider seasonal farm workers who come year after year from Mexico), we may have an obligation to "citizenize" some of these relationships as well. The outcome need not be to extend the formal status of Canadian citizenship to such people (e.g., to seasonal workers). Perhaps the outcome would be some new political status, such as "denizenship," which better reflects the actual nature of the interests

and interdependencies at stake.[7] What matters, from a citizenization perspective, is not a static list of rights or formal status, but rather the commitment to build new relationships based on values of consent, autonomy, self-determination, recognition, and so on. Here again, there are relevant experiments in citizenizing relationships beyond the bounds of popular sovereignty and the nation-state that are worthy of exploration.[8]

So we have unresolved issues about the frontiers of citizenization, which are obscured in the traditional debate on responsible citizenship, since it typically presupposes that the status of citizen is already settled. In the traditional debate, we all know who the citizens are, and the contexts within which citizenship operates. But once we think of citizenization as a dynamic historical process, it is far from clear how far citizenization extends (or should extend).[9]

7. For an interesting analysis of the rights of migrant workers that appeals to the values of citizenization (e.g., values of consent and autonomy) but that leads to a legal and political status other than formal citizenship, see Ottonelli and Torresi (2012).

8. In his position paper on responsible citizenship for the Foundation's 2007 Summer Institute, Daniel Weinstock suggested something similar in reverse: namely, that people who inherited or acquired Canadian citizenship but who have lived abroad long-term might have their citizenship status reduced. The result would be a new political status (say, non-resident citizen), but one that better reflects the real nature of the interests and interdependencies at stake. I do not necessarily support this idea, but it confirms the point that citizenization should be understood as a process for structuring relationships according to core democratic values, rather than in terms of any specific formal legal status. The process of citizenization can lead to a range of legal statuses that reflect the autonomy and consent of the parties to the relationship.

9. A different issue regarding the frontiers of citizenization concerns the relevant social spheres in which the ideal applies. We typically think that people have no obligation to reorder their purely "private" relationships on the basis of ideals of citizenization. For example, it is permissible for the Catholic Church to order its internal life on non-democratic principles, at least within certain limits. Citizenization does not go all the way down: not

So the idea of citizenization opens up new possibilities in terms of the range of actors and relationships that we consider as subject to citizenship values, within and beyond the nation-state. But even if we focus on the more traditional set of relationships among already recognized citizens of a nation-state, the idea of citizenization opens up new perspectives not captured in the traditional debate about traits and sites of responsible citizenship.

Immigration and the New Citizenship Agenda: As I noted earlier, many Western democracies have recently embraced a new "citizen-ship agenda" to address the (alleged) challenges that immigration poses to the practice of responsible citizenship. This citizenship agenda has been based on the premise that (a) immigrants are likely to have deficits in their citizenship skills and dispositions, and/or (b) that increasing ethnic and religious diversity due to immigration erodes solidarity and trust in the general population. I mentioned earlier that both of these premises are empirically contestable, par-ticularly in the Canadian case. But it should be clear, I hope, that a citizenization framework would ask entirely different questions.

From a citizenization perspective, the question is whether the social relationship between the native-born and newcomers is one that is typically governed by democratic values of deliberation, consent, and autonomy, or whether it is prone to being governed by uncivil practices of force and paternalism. Insofar as the latter is the case—as it surely is—then we must ensure that programs and projects of citizenship promotion do not reproduce the very assumptions and stereotypes that feed practices of force and pater-nalism. If the new citizenship policies and projects are premised on assumptions of paternalism and distrust—as is arguably the case

all associations and relationships need to think of themselves as either seed-beds or sites of citizenship. But how precisely we define the relevant "private" sphere within which citizenization is not required is a complex question. For thoughtful exploration of this issue, see Rosenblum (2000).

with coercive "civic integration" policies toward Muslim immigrants in Western Europe—then they contradict the goal of citizenization, even if they seek to build new seedbeds and sites of responsible citizenship.[10] To promote responsible citizenship through policies that stigmatize a group as incompetent and untrustworthy is counterproductive.

It does not follow that all aspects of these new immigrant-focused citizenship agendas are unsound. I do not think that citizenship tests or citizenship ceremonies are, in and of themselves, good or bad. The question, rather, is whether they respect the core assumptions and values of citizenization—to repeat, that citizens have a subjective good that they are competent to express, that our shared rules must be responsive to those expressions, and that we trust each other to negotiate those shared rules in ways that respect one another's autonomy and identity, and to cooperate in good faith. Viewed this way, it seems clear that citizenship policies vary enormously across countries and, over time, in whether they advance or impede the goals of citizenization.[11]

Deep Diversity: While I believe that much of the anxiety over the corrosive impact of immigrant diversity on civic values of trust

10. These policies compel newcomers to attend integration classes, and to pass various language and civic knowledge tests, in order to maintain their residency or welfare benefits. Even defenders of these new civic integration policies such as Christian Joppke acknowledge that they use illiberal means in pursuit of liberal-democratic citizenship (Joppke, 2007). Phil Triadafilopoulos (2011) describes these policies as a manifestation of "Schmittian liberalism."

11. For an interesting comparison of citizenship tests in Canada and Denmark, illustrating the very different assumptions that govern the relationship between the native-born and newcomers in the two countries, see Adamo (2008). See also Paquet (2012) for a similar comparison of citizenship tests in Canada and Britain. See also the website of the Institute for Canadian Citizenship(http://www.icc-icc.ca/en/) (co-founded by Adrienne Clarkson and John Ralston Saul) for an example of a citizenship agenda in relation to immigrants that is clearly informed by a citizenization model.

and solidarity is overstated, there is a separate issue about the relationship between diversity and citizenization that deserves more attention. I mentioned earlier that citizenization presupposes some idea of boundedness, which traditionally has been understood in terms of the nation-state, defined as the possession of a single nation or people. This model has always been a poor fit in Canada, due to the persistence of distinct national identities among French Canadians/Quebecois and Aboriginal peoples, compounded by the extraordinary diversity arising from recent waves of immigration. In the traditional debate on responsible citizenship, the challenge of this "deep diversity" is understood in terms of traits (e.g., the need for tolerance, intercultural communication) and sites (e.g., how to build public spaces open to the expression of difference).[12] But if we think instead in terms of citizenization, the challenge becomes more complex and multi-layered. Insofar as citizenization is a social project to reorder older relations of hierarchy and exclusion, then it operates in Canada at multiple levels, both across long-standing national divisions (e.g., trying to citizenize relations between English and French, or between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people), but also within each national project (e.g., trying to citizenize relations within Quebec between old-stock Quebecois and immigrant communities). We have a palimpsest of incomplete or ongoing citizenization projects: we have unresolved issues relating to Canada's origins as a settler state on indigenous lands, unresolved issues relating to English and French, and unresolved issues relating to racialized

12. I take the term "deep diversity" from Taylor (1992), who argues that "the politics of recognition" takes very different forms in the case of Aboriginal people, Quebec, and racialized ethnic groups. I think that this diversity in demands for "recognition" is itself rooted in the diversity of their respective projects of citizenization. While Taylor's writings often display great sensitivity to the connection between demands for recognition and citizenization projects, his theoretical formulation of the "politics of recognition" does not sufficiently stress the connection.

ethnic groups, and all of these unresolved issues interact in complex and sometimes pathological ways.

For example, the federal multiculturalism policies adopted to help citizenize relations with ethno-racial minorities are seen by some as undermining the policies needed to citizenize relations with Quebec or with Aboriginal peoples. I believe this perception is misguided, but it is an issue that can be resolved only by under-standing it as the intersection of multiple citizenization projects. The challenge of deep diversity is not just a matter of needing new traits or sites of citizenship, rather, the challenge is that it calls forth mul-tiple citizenization projects whose interaction is unpredictable and unstable.

Domestic and Global Citizenship: We can ask a similar question about the relationship between citizenization at the domestic and global levels. Citizenization has traditionally been understood in relation to the nation-state, and that remains true even of the more "multicultural" and "multinational" conception of citizenization we have developed in Canada to address issues of deep diversity. But increasingly Canadians seek to enact their citizenship at trans-national or global levels, engaging in international projects or cam-paigns relating to climate change, global poverty, endangered species, refugees, foreign intervention and civil wars, free trade agreements, and so on. But how does this global citizenship relate to national cit-izenship? How should we integrate our responsibilities as domestic and global citizens?

Here we see contradictory trends. On the one hand, it is often said that part of what it means to be a good Canadian is to be a good citizen of the world, and indeed a recent study by Alison Brysk describes Canada as a "global good Samaritan" because of the way we've seen internationalism as part of our national identity (Brysk, 2009). On the other hand, Canada is routinely (and perhaps rightly) described as a "rogue state" (Broadhead, 2001) because of our hard-nosed and self-centred opposition to various international

initiatives (from climate change to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indiginous Peoples to the international rules on asbestos). What is striking is how little consistency there is across these debates: we switch from more or less untrammelled national egoism to genuinely cosmopolitan sentiments. This suggests that we do not yet have a clear idea of how to reconcile our domestic responsibilities to our co-citizens with our global responsibilities to the rest of the world. There is a growing intellectual debate about ideas of "rooted cosmopolitanism"—that is, the idea that being a good citizen of the world does not require transcending one's local loyalties and identities, but rather is rooted in the ethos and practices of local patriotism. For rooted cosmopolitans, the commitment to being a good Canadian is itself a source of, and not an obstacle to, the commitment to being a good cosmopolitan citizen of the world. There is surely some merit in this idea, but also much mythology, and we need to separate out the reality and the myths. Here again, I think this challenge is best parsed not just as an issue of creating new traits and sites of global citizenship, but as figuring out the dynamic interaction between historic projects of domestic citizenization and newer social projects of transnational citizenization.[13]

Neoliberalism: Finally, consider the impact of neoliberalism on the prospects for citizenization. Starting in the 1980s, we have lived through an era of dramatic changes in the global political economy, with the expansion of global trade and free trade agreements, the deregulation of financial markets, the weakening of trade unions and "flexibilization" of labour markets, and the privatization of industries and pensions. These changes—often labelled as neoliberalism (or "market fundamentalism" to its critics)—have challenged many of the key institutions and actors that helped underpin postwar struggles for citizenization. As I noted earlier, many of the most

13. For some preliminary efforts to investigate this interaction, see the essays in Kymlicka and Walker (2012).

visible struggles for citizenization—those of women, gays, people with disabilities, ethnic minorities, and indigenous peoples—have had a similar trajectory, one that is intimately bound up with the traditional national welfare state. These movements emerged in the 1960s, and insofar as they were successful, it was in part by becoming embedded within the institutions of the welfare state, gaining representation on government advisory boards, public funding for advocacy, and recognition in anti-discrimination and affirmative action policies. This entire infrastructure of "interest intermediation" connecting citizenization movements to the state has been weakened, if not entirely dissolved, in the era of neoliberalism. Indeed, one of the first goals of neoliberal reformers was precisely to attack what they viewed as the inappropriate strings connecting the state to advocacy groups and social movements.

Neoliberalism not only undermined the institutional infrastructure of citizenization movements, it has also attempted to undermine the ideological basis of these movements. Neoliberalism has valorized the hard-working taxpayers over "special interests." As Matt James puts it, neoliberals invoked discourses that "valorized the so-called "ordinary Canadian," figured as a taxpayer and consumer, to delegitimize group experiences and identities as positive considerations in civic deliberation and debate" (James, 2013).

These changes have been seen by some commentators as essentially eroding any space for meaningful citizenship. Viewed from within the traditional framework of responsible citizenship, neoliberalism is seen as eroding both the traits of good citizenship (e.g., by valorizing "consumers" over "citizens," or by valorizing greed over public-interestedness) and the spaces of citizenship (e.g., by commercializing the media, privatizing public goods and public spaces, etc.). From a citizenization perspective, neoliberalism has been seen as inherently at odds with any commitment to an ethos or practice of citizenization. According to Margaret Somers, for example, neoliberalism is about extending the reach of markets

in people's lives, and hence about turning social relationships into market relationships rather than citizenship relationships (Somers, 2008). Neoliberalism is about encouraging and enabling people to be effective actors in global markets, not about encouraging and enabling them to be effective citizens in democratic deliberation and self-government. Even when neoliberals seemed to embrace some of the discourses of earlier citizenization movements—as in the neoliberal embrace of multiculturalism—the similarity in discourse hides very different substantive commitments. Multiculturalism, from a neoliberal perspective, is valuable insofar as cultural diversity and transnational bonds are market assets, promoting innovation or global economic linkages. Neoliberal multiculturalism affirms—even valorizes—ethnic immigrant entrepreneurship and transnational commercial linkages, but ignores issues about how to build new relations of democratic citizenship in the face of histories of ethnic and racial hierarchy.[14]

I think there is some truth in this pessimistic reading of the impact of neoliberalism on the prospects for citizenization. The golden age of citizenization movements in the West may well have peaked in the 1970s and 1980s, and many of these movements have been on the defensive since then. And as I noted earlier, in the case of immigrant groups, this retreat from citizenization has been hastened by other global changes, most obviously 9/11, the perceived "clash of civilizations" between the West and Islam, and the resulting securitization of immigration. The combination of a neoliberal state and a security state is hardly propitious grounds for citizenization struggles.

However, we should not overestimate the hegemony of neoliberalism as policy or ideology. Neoliberal ideas have never succeeded in displacing deep-seated public commitments to principles and

14. For influential discussions of the shift from a (left-liberal) social movement multiculturalism to a neoliberal corporate multiculturalism in Canada, see Abu-Laban and Gabriel (2002), Abu-Laban (2009; 2013), Mitchell (2003), and James (2013), discussed further in Kymlicka (2013).

practices of democratic citizenship, and some citizenization move-
ments (such as those of gays) have had marked successes even in
the era of neoliberalism. Moreover, while it is true that neoliberal-
ism is fundamentally about enabling people to be market actors
rather than democratic citizens, we should not ignore the extent to
which neoliberalism offers its own conception of citizenship that we
need to take seriously. Paradoxically, at the core of this conception
of citizenship is precisely the idea of responsibility. Jacob Hacker
has defined neoliberalism as a "personal responsibility crusade," in
which risks that used to be seen as a matter of collective responsib-
ility (such as unemployment or health or pensions) are said to be a
matter of personal responsibility (Hacker, 2006). In this view, when
people look to society to pay for the costs of their own reckless or
imprudent choices, it is they who are acting selfishly, externalizing
the costs of their choices onto others. For neoliberals, the old welfare
state condones irresponsibility, whereas neoliberal reforms ensure
that we are responsible citizens.

As Hacker shows, the outcome of this personal responsibility
crusade in the United States has been pathological and destructive,
but the neoliberal conception of individual responsibility retains
broad public appeal. In this context, it is not enough to bemoan the
impact of neoliberalism on the virtues and sites of citizenship. The
deeper challenge is to respond to the underlying presuppositions
about the role of personal responsibility within our conception of
citizenship. We need a more sophisticated account of how to inte-
grate the logic of shared responsibility inherent in citizenization
with the logic of individual responsibility. I believe that reforms
aimed at redressing historic relations of hierarchy can often be seen
as enabling people to take greater responsibility for their lives and
their choices, and not as part of a "nanny state" that usurps that
responsibility. But the tenor of public debate suggests that this
connection is not clear to many people, perhaps due to the way
neoliberalism has demonized "hand outs" to "special interests." The

era of neoliberal "market fundamentalism" may now be over, but it continues to have enduring effects on how we think about responsibility, and about what we owe each other, and hence about what forms of citizenization are appropriate, in relation to which sorts of social relationships.

In sum, framing issues of responsible citizenship in terms of the historic process and social project of citizenization, rather than as a static list of traits and sites, helps to deepen the analysis and bring fresh insights. It helps point us beyond traditional debates about the seedbeds and sites of responsible citizenship to focus on the restructuring of social relationships on the basis of values of democratic consent and autonomy.

4. The Role of the Foundation

There is an exciting research agenda here, and I believe that the Foundation has a distinctive advantage in pursuing it. The traditional framework for debating responsible citizenship has largely been monopolized by three disciplines: political science, law, and education. This sort of disciplinary "ownership" of citizenship makes sense on the traditional framework: assessing the formal legal status of citizenship engages the discipline of law; assessing whether individuals have the political dispositions and political sites needed to enact their formal citizenship engages political science; and insofar as schools are given a special role and responsibility to educate people for citizenship, it engages the discipline of education. This sort of specialized disciplinary research into the formal status of citizenship, the political dispositions and behaviour of citizens, and citizenship education has been reasonably well supported in Canada by SSHRC and other funding bodies.[15]

If we reframe the debate in terms of citizenization, however, we immediately engage a much broader range of disciplines, including

15. Federal departments, such as Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and provincial ministries of education, have also funded research in this field.

history, economics, sociology, psychology, geography, media studies, and others. While law and politics are still the most visible sites of citizenization struggles, the social project of citizenization is also intimately bound up with processes of cultural representation (e.g., in the media or museums), the use of public space, the formation of social identities and of historic narratives, and patterns of economic and social interdependency.

Consider the current Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC), established to deal with the legacy of the Indian residential schools. It is in many ways a paradigmatic example of citizenization, intended to acknowledge the wrongs of earlier uncivil relations based on force and paternalism ("a sincere indication and acknowledgement of the injustices and harms experienced by Aboriginal people"), and to restructure those relationships on the basis of equality and consent ("a profound commitment to estab-lishing new relationships embedded in mutual recognition and respect").[16] But the ways and means of achieving this goal, in the view of the TRC, involves a "holistic" process of "healing" that includes such things as commemorations, witnessing, and artistic representations, and hence needing the expertise and experience of practitioners and scholars of history (written and oral), cultural studies, literature, the visual arts, psychology, and anthropology. One can certainly give a narrow political science or legal analysis of this process—the TRC was after all the product of political negotiation and a legal settlement—but such an analysis would almost certainly miss many of its most distinctive features, and many of the factors that will determine its success or failure.[17]

16. For an overview of the TRC's mandate, see the "Our Mandate" page on the TRC website, http://www.trc-cvr.ca/overview.html

17. It is interesting in this respect to note that the most sustained analyses of the TRC in Canada have come from within the humanities rather than law or political science—see the essays collected in Henderson and Wakeham (2013).

Or consider the challenge of citizenization in relation to those who lack complex cognitive skills, such as children or animals. If, as I argued earlier, the values of citizenization should nonetheless inform our relations with them, then we clearly need to draw heavily on fields such as developmental psychology (for children) or ethology (for animals).

Citizenization, in short, is a complex social, cultural, legal, and political project, and needs to be studied as such. In my view, the Foundation is in a unique position to advance this sort of agenda because of the way it can work outside of traditional disciplinary silos, and can bridge and connect the humanities and social sciences. I should also note that pursuing this agenda offers potential benefits to the Foundation, since it would more securely tie "Responsible Citizenship" to the Foundation's other themes.

Consider the theme of "Human Rights and Dignity." I noted earlier that in the traditional view, citizenship is tied to membership in bounded communities, whereas human rights are owed to all persons as such—that is to say, citizenship is about membership rights, but human rights are independent of membership. Viewed this way, citizenship and human rights are locked into separate analytical categories. But if we shift our focus from the formal status of citizenship to the process of citizenization, then the important linkages with human rights emerge into view. In fact, I would argue that the human rights revolution and struggles for citizenization are two sides of the same coin, both rooted in the same commitment to repudiating and redressing older ideologies of hierarchy that have historically legitimated the mistreatment or neglect of particular individuals or groups. Exploring the links between citizenization struggles and human rights struggles would help illuminate both, helping us to avoid overly formal or legalistic accounts of the former, and overly abstract or atomistic conceptions of the latter. Citizenization struggles are never just about formal legal status, and human rights struggles are never just about respecting abstract

personhood. Rather, both are struggles against particular practices and ideologies that have historically condemned particular individuals or groups to oppression or invisibility.

A citizenization framework would also help strengthen ties to the theme of "Canada in the World." Here again, the traditional conception of responsible citizenship is tied to membership in a bounded community, and so has trouble conceiving our international obligations as obligations of citizenship. But if we shift to the idea of citizenization, then, as I noted earlier, there is no reason why citizenization as a process should stop at national borders, or should be restricted to those who hold the formal status of national citizens. A citizenization framework can not only help us see the links between domestic citizenship and international responsibilities, but also make sense of the fact that are our international responsibilities (like our domestic responsibilities) likely to be differentiated. Just as our obligations to particular groups of domestic co-citizens are shaped by the distinctive histories of those relationships, so too are our obligations to particular countries likely to be shaped by our historic relationships with them. For example, insofar as we have recruited farm workers from Mexico, or health practitioners from sub-Saharan Africa, we may have particular obligations to those countries. These specific obligations, rooted in histories of interaction, are often ignored in more "cosmopolitan" accounts of our international obligations, which offer only an ahistorical account of what global justice requires. A citizenization perspective would force us to consider the complex ways Canada has historically been implicated in (often unjust) relations with other peoples and cultures of the world, and to consider what type of international activism would be responsive to that history. In foreign affairs, as in domestic affairs, citizenization offers a more dynamic and relational perspective.

And, finally, albeit more speculatively, if we take seriously the suggestion that a citizenization perspective can be applied to at least some animals, this would have profound effects on the final

Foundation theme of "People and their Natural Environment." Animal rights advocates have long argued that animals cannot be reduced to or subsumed within the broader category of "nature" without losing sight of our unique moral obligations to them as sentient beings with a subjective good. But I would go further and argue that those obligations in turn can be illuminated by asking when, or under what conditions, our relations with animals should be restructured in light of the underlying values of citizenization. We might ask, for example, whether animals have sovereignty rights (or property rights) over particular territories, or mobility rights over particular airways or land corridors, or representation rights in decisions about resource development. If we accept this rather speculative idea, which I defend at length elsewhere (Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011), then the links between responsible citizenship and the environment multiply in complexity. It is already a familiar idea in environmental ethics that our responsibilities as citizens include responsibilities for the natural world—to be a good citizen is to be environmentally conscious—and this has generated a lively literature on "environmental citizenship" or "ecological citizenship" (e.g., Eckersley, 2004). But we might contemplate the possibility not only that environmental concerns should inform our theory of responsible citizenship, but also that the values of citizenization should inform our relations to animals, acknowledging that human beings are not the only beings with citizenship rights and responsibilities in relation to the natural environment.[18]

18. There are other ways of connecting citizenship to the environment theme. It is widely recognized that any serious process of citizenization in relation to Aboriginal peoples will require addressing the different conceptions of land or territory held by Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies in Canada. These different conceptions underpin various ongoing disputes about the nature of Aboriginal land claims and property rights, which are central to the citizenization process, but they also are potentially important for developing new perspectives on the theme of "People and their Natural Environment."

In these and other ways, the idea of citizenization can inform the work of the Foundation, helping to connect the various disciplines and themes covered by the Foundation's mandate.

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